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Abstract
This paper considers tests of the e¤ectiveness of a policy intervention, dened as a change
in the parameters of a policy rule, in the context of a macroeconometric dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model. We consider two types of intervention, rst the standard
case of a parameter change that does not alter the steady state, and second one that does
alter the steady state, e.g. the target rate of ination. We consider two types of test, one a
multi-horizon test, where the post-intervention policy horizon, H, is small and xed, and a
mean policy e¤ect test where H is allowed to increase without bounds. The multi-horizon test
requires Gaussian errors, but the mean policy e¤ect test does not. It is shown that neither
of these two tests are consistent, in the sense that the the power of the tests does not tend
to unity as H ! 1, unless the intervention alters the steady state. This follows directly
from the fact that DSGE variables are measured as deviations from the steady state, and
the e¤ects of policy change on target variables decay exponentially fast. We investigate the
size and power of the proposed mean e¤ect test by simulating a standard three equation New
Keynesian DSGE model. The simulation results are in line with our theoretical ndings and
show that in all applications the tests have the correct size; but unless the intervention alters
the steady state, their power does not go to unity with H:
Keywords: Counterfactuals, policy analysis, policy ine¤ectiveness test, macroeconomics
JEL classication: C18, C54, E65,
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1 Introduction
This paper considers testing the e¤ectiveness of a policy intervention given time-series data on
outcome variables, both before and after the policy change. The policy e¤ect is measured as the
di¤erence between the policy outcome, the post-intervention realized values, and a counterfactual.
The counterfactual is constructed assuming no policy intervention, using parameters estimated
on the pre-intervention sample.1 While there are many ways that one could construct such a
counterfactual, this paper considers the case where it is obtained from a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model whose variables are measured as deviations from the steady
state.2 The realized policy outcomes will reect both a deterministic component, the e¤ect of the
intervention, and a stochastic component, the post-intervention disturbances or shocks.
In the DSGE literature a typical policy intervention is a monetary policy shock, calculated
as a one standard error displacement of the structural disturbance of a policy equation, such
as a Taylor rule. The impulse response function (IRF) is the time prole of the deterministic
component of the e¤ect of such a displacement, and as discussed in Section 2.1, yields ex ante
information about the way the model responds to such a displacement, not an ex post evaluation
of the e¤ectiveness of an actual policy intervention. As we shall see, IRFs ignore the cumulative
uncertainty associated with the stochastic component, the post-intervention disturbances. While
one can construct tests for such displacements, we focus on interventions that change policy
parameters. The rst type of intervention, such as changing parameters of the Taylor Rule, does
not alter the steady state. The second type, such as changing the target rate of ination, does
alter the steady state. We show that if the intervention does not alter the steady state, the power
of the tests will not go to unity as the post-intervention horizon, H; gets large. This is an inherent
consequence of the fact that DSGE models use variables measured as deviations from the steady
state and the e¤ects of policy changes decay exponentially fast. Thus unless the intervention
alters the steady state we cannot be sure that it has had an e¤ect.
Tests based on the di¤erences between realizations and counterfactuals are standard in the
statistical literature and have been used to examine a range of macroeconometric questions.
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) examine the e¤ect of terrorism on the Basque country using a
"synthetic control region" as a counterfactual. Hsiao, Ching and Wan (2012) examine the e¤ect
on growth in Hong Kong of political and economic integration with mainland China, using a panel
data approach to construct a counterfactual using predictions from similar economies. Synthetic
control and panel data counterfactuals are compared by Gardeazabal and Vega-Bayo (2016).
Pesaran, Smith and Smith (2007) examine what would have happened to the economies of the
UK and the eurozone had the UK joined the euro in 1999, using "euro" restrictions on a GVAR
1The Lucas Critique does not apply since counterfactuals are estimated using the pre-intervention sample, and
the policy-induced parameter change gets reected in the realized post-intervention outcomes, which embody the
e¤ect of the change in the policy parameters and any consequent changes to expectations.
2Policy ine¤ectiveness tests where the counterfactuals are obtained from reduced or nal form specications are
considered in Pesaran and Smith (2016).
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model to construct a counterfactual. Fagan, Lothian and McNelis (2013) examine whether the
Gold Standard was in fact destabilising, constructing the counterfactual by replacing the pre-1914
US money supply process with a Taylor rule in a DSGE model.
Rather than comparing actuals with counterfactuals, the mainstream macro-economic litera-
ture has tended to emphasise estimation issues in the context of structural vector autoregressions
(VARs) and DSGEs. For instance, in the case of the Volcker disination which marked the transi-
tion from an era of macroeconomic turbulence and high ination to an era of "Great Moderation"
and low ination, Primiceri (2006) provides an explanation of changes in policy in terms of learn-
ing about the parameters of the Phillips curve. Sims and Zha (2006) estimate regime switching
structural VARs and nd that the best t allows time variation in the error variances only. Boivin
and Giannoni (2006) argue that by responding more strongly to ination expectations, monetary
policy stabilised the economy more e¤ectively after 1980. Inoue and Rossi (2011) investigate the
sources of the Great Moderation and, using a representative New Keynesian and structural VAR
models, show that the substantial decrease in output growth volatility during mid-1980s was due
to changes in monetary policy parameters, as well as to other parameters rather than just good
luck (reduced shock volatilities).
In contrast, the focus of the present paper is on formal statistical tests of the e¤ects of a policy
intervention. The null hypothesis is policy ine¤ectiveness: no change in policy parameters.3
This null hypothesis is tested in conjunction with the maintained assumption that non-policy
parameters remain stable.4 We consider two types of test. The rst is a multi-horizon test, where
the post-intervention policy horizon, H, is small and xed. This has a chi-squared distribution.
The second is a test of the mean policy e¤ect where H tends to innity, which has a standard
normal distribution. The multi-horizon test will have more power but requires Gaussian errors,
whereas the mean e¤ect test does not require Gaussianity. There is thus a trade-o¤between power
and robustness to the failure of the Gaussian assumption. In both cases the power of the test will
only go to one as H goes to innity if the intervention changes the steady state. We assume a
best case scenario for the tests namely that the DSGE model is well specied and identied, such
that we can obtain
p
T consistent estimates of its parameters.
The power of the test increases with the degree of persistence of the model. The higher the
degree of persistence, the longer the e¤ects of the intervention last, the easier it is to detect them.
The power is also increased by the distance the economy is from its steady state at the time of
intervention. A parameter change when the economy is in steady state cannot be detected. In
practice, major policy interventions tend to take place at times when the economy is far from its
steady state, increasing power.
We investigate the size and power of the proposed mean policy e¤ect test by simulating a
3Note that we are concerned with the empirical issue of whether the e¤ect of a policy change can be detected
not the theoretical policy ine¤ectiveness proposition of Sargent and Wallace (1975).
4 In practice, it is di¢ cult to isolate the e¤ects of policy change from other non-policy related parameter changes.
All statistical tests, in one form or another, are joint tests of model specication and the null hypothesis of interest.
As a result, the test outcomes must be interpreted with care.
2
standard three equation New Keynesian DSGE model. The model exhibits the usual impulse
responses when subject to demand, supply and monetary policy shocks. To illustrate the factors
inuencing power of the policy ine¤ectiveness test, we also present policy impulse response func-
tions that show the time prole of the e¤ects of a change in policy parameters. The simulation
results are in line with our theoretical ndings and show that in all applications the tests have the
correct size; but unless the intervention changes the steady state, their power can be low. When
the policy intervention changes the ination target, the test has power for the e¤ects on ination
and interest rates, but not on output due to models long run neutrality properties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 species the DSGE model. Section
3 describes the types of policy interventions to be considered. Section 4 sets out the policy
intervention tests and their underlying assumptions, derives their asymptotic distributions, and
discusses their power properties. Tests of policy interventions that do not change the steady state
are considered in sub-section 4.1, where the properties of the multi-horizon and the mean e¤ect
tests are considered. Sub-section 4.2 discusses the properties of the two types of tests in the
case of interventions that only change the steady state. Section 5 provides a simulated policy
analysis of the New Keynesian model and the performance of the mean e¤ect test, including tests
for interventions which change both the parameters of the DSGE model and of the steady state.
Section 6 provides some concluding remarks. The more technical derivations are given in an online
supplement.
2 Specication of the DSGE model
Consider a standard rational expectations (RE) DSGE model, where all the variables are endoge-
nous.5 Denote the set of endogenous variables by the (kz + 1)  1 vector qt = (yt; z0t)0; where
yt is the target variable, and qt; contains policy and non policy variables. The deviations from
steady state are eqt = qt   qt (); where  is a vector of parameters that a¤ect the steady state,
including policy variables like the target rate of ination or the target rate of growth of money
supply. The DSGE model determining deviations from steady state is given by
A0eqt = A1Et(eqt+1) + A2eqt 1 + ut; (1)
where the structural disturbances, ut, have mean zero, E(ut) = 0; are serially uncorrelated and
have a constant, typically diagonal, variance matrix, E(utu0t) = u. Et(eqt+1) = E(eqt+1 j It);
where It is the information set that includes ut, and the lagged values of the variables, eqt. By
construction it is assumed that E (eqt) = 0.
Initially we abstract from parameter estimation uncertainty and denote the vector of structural
and policy parameters of the DSGE model by , and assume that u remains invariant to any
policy change.6 Thus eqt = eqt(; ) and the deviations from steady state are a function of both
5The model can be readily extended to allow for exogenous variables, such as oil prices or foreign variables.
6 is often referred to as a vector of deep parameters and elements of matrices, Ai; i = 0; 1; 2 are dened as
functions of .
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the parameters that determine the steady state, ; and those that appear in the DSGE model,
. Unless necessary for clarity, we will suppress the dependence of eqt on , and .
An example of such a system is the three equation New Keynesian DSGE model, which we
simulate in Section 5. In this model, the DSGE policy parameters are the parameters of the
Taylor rule, the steady state policy parameter is the target rate of ination.
Under the above set up, the RE model (1) has the unique solution7
eqt = ()eqt 1 +  ()ut; (2)
if the quadratic matrix equation
A1
2  A0 + A2 = 0; (3)
has a solution, , with all its eigenvalues inside the unit circle, and  () = (A0  A1) 1. Below
we shall also use the reduced form disturbances, "t =  ()ut, and note that
"() = E("t"
0
t) = (A0  A1) 1u(A0  A1)
0 1: (4)
The unique solution of the RE model in (2) is a vector autoregression, and corresponds to the
reduced form of a standard simultaneous equations model where there are no exogenous variables.
The DSGE parameter vector, , is composed of a set of policy parameters, p, and a set
of structural parameters, s, that are invariant to changes in p. Similarly, the steady state
parameters can be divided into p and s: A policy intervention is dened in terms of a change
in one or more elements of p or p. It is assumed that the policy parameters are under the control
of the policy maker. The null hypothesis of our test is policy ine¤ectiveness, dened as no change in
the parameters. We assume that the model is known by economic agents, the announcement and
implementation of the intervention are credible, and no further changes are expected.8 We suppose
that the policy intervention occurs at the end of time t = T0, and we have a pre-intervention
sample, t = M;M + 1; :::; T0, and a post-intervention sample, t = T0 + 1; T0 + 2; ::; T0 + H.
Therefore, the post-intervention evaluation horizon is H and the sample size for estimation of the
pre-intervention parameters is T = T0  M + 1: This notation allows us to increase the sample
size T (by letting M !  1), while keeping the date of the intervention xed at T0.
2.1 Policy e¤ects and impulse responses
In the literature the e¤ects of policy interventions are usually investigated using the impulse
response function. Consider a policy intervention at time T0 + 1 dened by a one standard
error, i; displacement of the disturbance of the ith equation of the model (taken to be a policy
equation). Since the structural disturbances are assumed to be orthogonal, then uT0+1 = iei,
where ei is a vector of zeros, except for its ith element which is set to unity. It is assumed
7For a discussion of alternative solutions of RE models see Chapter 20 of Pesaran (2015).
8Kulish and Pagan (2017) consider solutions of forward looking models in the case of imperfect credibility where
policy announcements are not necessarily incorporated into expectations.
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that the structural parameters,  and , are invariant to such an intervention. Therefore, the
counterfactual associated with the event uT0+1 = iei is given by eqT0+h(i) = E(eqT0+h j uT0+1 =
iei; IT0), where iterating (2) forward from T0 yields
eqT0+h = h()eqT0 + h 1X
j=0
j ()  ()uT0+h j ; h = 1; 2; :::;H. (5)
Hence eqT0+h(i) = h () eqT0 + ih 1 ()  ()ei: (6)
The realized policy e¤ect of this displacement is
dT0+h(i) = eqT0+h   eqT0+h(i); (7)
which upon using (5) and (6) gives
dT0+h(i) =  ih 1 ()  ()ei + VT0;h () ; (8)
where
VT0;h () =
h 1X
j=0
j ()  ()uT0+h j : (9)
The IRF for this shock scenario is given by,
IRF (h; i;) = i
h 1 ()  ()ei; (10)
which refers only to the deterministic component of the realized e¤ect of the policy, dT0+h(i), and
ignores the random componentVT0;h (), which could be quite important, particularly considering
the cumulative nature of the future shocks in (9). Note that
V ar [VT0;h ()] =
h 1X
j=0
j ()  ()u 
0()0j () ; (11)
which is increasing in h and can be quite sizeable as compared to the IRF (h; i;) component
of dT0+h(i). Any attempt at ex post policy evaluation must also take account of the possible
e¤ects of the future disturbances, uT0+h for h = 1; 2; :::;H, on the outcomes. In fact, Benati and
Surico (2009) show how structural VAR based counterfactuals and impulse response functions,
which treat policies as being about shock impulse response functions, may be misleading in not
revealing changes in policy parameters, which is the focus of concern here.
In what follows we focus on policy interventions that involve changes in  and ; introduce the
concept of policy impulse response function (PIRF) to be contrasted with the IRF; and propose
ex post tests of policy e¤ectiveness.
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3 Types of policy interventions
3.1 Policy interventions that do not change the steady state
First consider a policy intervention that changes one or more elements of p, but leaves the steady
state unchanged. This will a¤ect the mean outcomes through changes in (), and the variance of
the outcomes through changes in  (). Denote the pre-intervention parameters by 0 = (00p ;
0
s)
0,
and the post-intervention parameters by 1 = (10p ;
0
s)
0, where one or more elements of p are
changed. If the intervention at t = T0 is fully communicated, and seen to be credible, with
expectations adjusting immediately, the process switches from
eqt = (0)eqt 1 +  (0)ut; t = M;M + 1;M + 2; :::; T0;
to eqt = (1)eqt 1 +  (1)ut; t = T0 + 1; T0 + 2; :::; T0 +H:
Suppose now that we are interested in the e¤ects of the intervention on the target variable ~yt =
s0eqt, where s is a the (kz + 1)  1 selection vector with all its elements zero except for its rst
element which is set to unity.9 The counterfactual values of the target variable, eyT0+h, under the
null hypothesis of no policy change is given by
ey0T0+h = s0h  0 eqT0 ; for h = 1; 2; :::;H; (12)
and only requires estimation of 0. The policy e¤ect of the intervention on the target variable is
then dened as the di¤erence between the realized value, yT0+h, and the associated counterfactual,
y0T0+h, namely
dT0+h(
0) = yT0+h   y0T0+h; h = 1; 2; :::;H: (13)
In the present case, where the intervention does not alter the steady state, then (13) can also be
written as
dT0+h(
0) = eyT0+h   ey0T0+h; h = 1; 2; :::;H: (14)
Now using (5) and (12), the realized policy e¤ects can be written as
dT0+h(
1;0) = s0
h
h
 
1
 h  0i eqT0 + VT0;h  1 ;
where VT0;h
 
1

is dened by (9) and evaluated at  = 1. As in the case of policy shocks
discussed in sub-section 2.1, the outcome of the policy change has a deterministic component,
which we refer to as the policy impulse response function (PIRF) given by
PIRFy(h;
0;1; eqT0) = s0 hh  1 h  0i eqT0 : (15)
PIRF is the expected di¤erence in the outcomes associated with the pre- and post-policy para-
meters. Also, unlike the impulse response function, (10), the PIRF depends on the state of the
9 If we are interested in more than one target variable the selection vector can be replaced by a selection matrix.
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economy at the time of the intervention, eqT0 . But like the IRF, due to the stationary nature of
the underlying DSGE model, the PIRF also tends to zero exponentially, which turns out to be
important for the power of the policy e¤ectiveness tests discussed below.
The stochastic component of the policy e¤ect dT0+h(
1;0), namely VT0;h
 
1

, increases in
importance with h, and also plays an important role in the policy ine¤ectiveness tests.
3.2 Policy interventions that change the steady state
Suppose that one or more parameters that determine the steady state and which are under the
control of the policy maker, denoted by p, are changed from 0p at the end of period T0, to 
1
p,
over the period t = T0 + 1; T0 + 2, ...T0 +H. The policy e¤ects in this case are measured in terms
of the original variables yT0+h, not deviations from the steady state, and are given by
dT0+h(;
0) = yT0+h   y0T0+h; h = 1; 2; :::;H; (16)
where yT0+h is the realized value of the target variable, yt, post-intervention and the counterfactual
is given by
y0T0+h = y

T0+h
 
0

+ s0h ()

qT0   qT0
 
0

; for h = 1; 2; :::;H: (17)
Note that in this case  has the same value before and after the policy change.10
3.3 Policy interventions that change volatilities
So far we have considered how the policy intervention changes the levels of the variables. One can
also consider how policy interventions change volatilities. Using (11), we can see that the e¤ect
of an intervention on volatility, the di¤erence between the variance with and without the policy
change, is given by
V ar
 eqT0+h j IT0 ;1  V ar  eqT0+h j IT0 ;0
=
h 1X
j=0
j
 
1

 (1)u 
0(1)0j
 
1
  h 1X
j=0
j
 
0

 (0)u 
0(0)0j
 
0

:
Conditional on the structural error variances, u, remaining constant, one could, in principle,
derive a test statistic, for a policy induced volatility change. This is beyond the scope of this
paper and is likely to be more challenging than the case discussed below of deriving a test for a
policy induced level change in eqT0+h. To test for the e¤ect of a policy induced level change one
only needs to estimate  on the pre-intervention sample, but to test for a policy induced volatility
change one would also need estimates of  for the post-intervention sample.
While much of the theoretical literature is concerned with the issue of policy induced reduction
in volatilities, in practice policy objectives are nearly always expressed in terms of their intended
10 It is also possible to consider a policy intervention that involves changes to both  and , and this case will
be considered in the simulations.
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level e¤ects; reducing ination, raising output, or reducing unemployment. Examples include the
Volcker commitment to reduce the level of ination, or the Japanese Government commitments
to increase ination/stop deation.
Finally, a mean shift is relatively easy to interpret, few would disagree that the reduction of
ination following the Volcker disination (what we would regard as a change in the steady state)
was the result of policy. A variance shift is more di¢ cult to interpret. In the case of the Great
Moderation, there is considerable dispute about whether the reduction in the variance of output
growth was due to good policy (changes in policy parameters, p) or good luck (reductions in
kuk).
4 Derivation of policy ine¤ectiveness tests
We derive tests for policy interventions that (i) change parameters of the DSGE model, p; without
changing the steady state, and (ii) policy interventions that change p, the policy parameter of
the steady state and do not change .11 Similar tests can also be developed for the policy shocks
discussed in sub-section 2.1.
We consider two types of closely related tests: a multi-horizon test and a mean e¤ect test. The
former takes the evaluation horizon, H; as xed, but assumes that the post policy intervention
errors, uT0+h; for h = 1; 2; :::;H, are Gaussian. The latter aims at reducing the dependence of
the test on the Gaussian assumption by considering policy e¤ects averaged over relatively long
evaluation horizon. Note, however, that neither tests require pre-policy intervention errors to be
Gaussian for su¢ ciently large T .
To simplify the exposition we continue with the case of a scalar target variable yt; being the rst
element of the (kz + 1) 1 vector of endogenous variables, qt = (yt; z0t)0. But the proposed tests
readily generalise to the case where there are more target variables. For notational convenience
we also set m = kz + 1.
To develop tests of policy e¤ects and derive their distribution we shall adopt the following
assumptions.
Assumption 1: The RE model dened by (1) has a unique solution given by (2), and
the structural parameters,  2 , are identied at 0 and 1 (the pre and post-intervention
parameters). The structural errors, ut, are serially uncorrelated with zero means and a constant
covariance matrix, u. In particular, u is invariant to the policy change.
Assumption 2a: The spectral radius of (), dened by jmax [()]j, is strictly less than
unity for values of  = 0 and 1 2 .12
Assumption 2b: There exists a matrix norm of (), denoted by k()k, such that
k()k < 1, for values of  = 0 and 1 2 .
Assumption 3: Standard regularity assumptions on the structural errors, ut, and the
11See also sub-sections 3.1 and 3.2.
12max(A) stands for the largest eigenvalue of matrix A.
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processes generating the exogenous variables (if any) apply such that 0 can be consistently
estimated by ^
0
T based on the pre-intervention sample, t = M;M + 1;M + 2; :::; T0, where
T = T0  M + 1; and ^0T = 0 +Op
 
T 1=2

. In particular
p
T

^
0
T   0

as N(0;0); and E
^0T   0 = O(T 1=2); (18)
where 0 is a symmetric positive denite matrix.
Assumption 4: () = (ij()), is bounded and continuously di¤erentiable in , such that@ij()=@0, for all i and j exist and are bounded.
Assumption 5: The initial values, eqT0 , are bounded, namely keqT0k < K; where K is a xed
positive constant.
Assumptions 1, 2a, 3 and 4 are standard in the literature on the econometric analysis of DSGE
models. The conditions for identication in Assumption 1 are discussed in Koop, Pesaran and
Smith (2013). Assumption 2a ensures that k()k < , where  is a nite positive constant.13
Assumption 2b is stronger than 2a and further requires that  < 1. This latter restriction allows
us to simplify the proofs considerably and obtain the main theoretical results without requiring
high order di¤erentiability of () which will be needed in the absence of Assumption 2b.
In cases where both H and T go to innity we shall also consider the following joint asymptotic
condition:
Condition 1 The post-intervention sample size, H, rises with the pre-intervention sample size,
T , such that H = T , where  is a xed positive constant, and   1=2.
4.1 Tests of policy interventions that do not change the steady state
Using (12), estimates of the counterfactuals in the absence of a policy change are given by
bey0T0+h = s0h ^0T eqT0 ; h = 1; 2; :::;H; (19)
where under Assumption 3, ^
0
T is a
p
T consistent estimator of  based on the pre-intervention
sample. Therefore, the estimated policy e¤ects are given by
d^T0+h(^
0
T ) = s
0eqT0+h   s0h ^0T eqT0 ; h = 1; 2; :::;H: (20)
The sampling distribution of d^T0+h(^
0
T ), depends on post-intervention parameters only under the
alternative that the policy is e¤ective, but not under the null hypothesis of no policy e¤ect as
dened by
H0 : 
1 = 0: (21)
To derive the distribution of the policy e¤ects, d^T0+h(^
0
T ); (for h = 1; 2; :::;H), rst recall that
post-intervention realized values, eqT0+h, are given by
13Note that there exists a matrix norm, kAk, such that jmax(A)j  kAk  jmax(A)j + , where  is a positive
constant. See, for example, Lemma 5.10.10 in Horn and Johnson (1985).
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eqT0+h = h  1 eqT0 + h 1X
j=0
j
 
1

 (1)uT0+h j . (22)
Using (22) and substituting the results for eqT0+h in (20) we have
d^T0+h(^
0
T ) = ^T0;h(^
0
T ) + vT0;h
 
1

; (23)
where
^T0;h(^
0
T ) =  s0
h
h

^
0
T

 h  1i eqT0 ; (24)
vT0;h
 
1

= s0VT0;h
 
1

=
h 1X
j=0
s0j
 
1

 (1)uT0+h j : (25)
In (23) the estimated policy e¤ect, d^T0+h(^
0
T ), has a systematic component, ^T0;h(^
0
T ), and a
stochastic component, vT0;h
 
1

; which is a weighted linear combination of serially uncorrelated
disturbances, ut, with the weights decaying exponentially under Assumption 2a.
4.1.1 A multi-horizon policy ine¤ectiveness test
A multi-horizon policy ine¤ectiveness test ofH0 can now be based on the policy e¤ects, d^T0+h(^
0
T ),
h = 1; 2; :::;H; jointly. When H is xed and T su¢ ciently large, such a policy ine¤ectiveness test
can be developed if we are prepared to make distributional assumptions regarding the post policy
shocks, uT0+h for h = 1; 2; :::;H. For example, assuming that post policy shocks are Gaussian
it readily follows that, under the null of no policy e¤ects, (21), and with T su¢ ciently large,
d^H =

d^T0+1(^
0
T ); d^T0+2(^
0
T ); :::; d^T0+H(^
0
T )
0
, has a multivariate normal distribution with zero
mean. This follows using (24) in (23), and noting that by Assumption 3 and under H0 : 1 = 0
we have
d^H =
 
s0 
 IH

vH
 
0

+Op

T 1=2

; (26)
where vH
 
0

=
 
vT0;1
 
0

; vT0;2
 
0

; :::; vT0;H
 
0
0
. Furthermore, using (25) and recalling
that m = kz + 1 we obtain
vH
 
0

=
0BBB@
Im 0m : : : 0m

 
0

Im : : : 0m
...
... : : :
...
h 1
 
0

h 2
 
0

: : : Im
1CCCA
0BBB@
 (0) 0m : : : 0m
0m  (
0) : : : 0m
...
... : : :
...
0m 0m : : :  (
0)
1CCCA
0BBB@
uT0+1
uT0+2
...
uT0+H
1CCCA
= 	
 
0
  
 (0)
 IH

uH . (27)
Also, under Assumption 1, V ar (uH) = (u 
 IH), and hence
V ar

vH
 
0

= 	
 
0
 
 (0)u 
0(0)
 IH

	0
 
0

;
which is an mH mH matrix. Hence, for T su¢ ciently large we have
V ar

d^H

=
 
s0 
 IH

	
 
0
 
 (0)u 
0(0)
 IH

	0
 
0

(s
 IH) : (28)
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The following test statistics can now be considered
TH = d^0H

\
V ar

d^H
 1
d^H ; (29)
where
\
V ar

d^H

=
 
s0 
 IH

	

^
0
T
 h
 (^
0
T )^u 
0(^
0
T )
 IH
i
	0

^
0
T

(s
 IH) : (30)
The estimators, ^u and ^
0
T , can be computed using the pre-intervention sample. Then under
Assumptions 1, 2a, 3, 4 and 5, it follows that TH ! 2H , for a xed H and as T ! 1. The test
can be extended readily to more than one target variable by replacing the selection vector s with
an appropriate selection matrix.
The power of the TH test Using (23), under the alternative hypothesis, H1 : 1 6= 1, we
have
d^H =
 
s0 
 IH

H +
 
s0 
 IH

vH
 
1

+Op

T 1=2

;
where H =

1(
0;1; eqT0); 2(0;1; eqT0); :::; H(0;1; eqT0)0, and h(0;1; eqT0) is the prob-
ability limit of ^T0;h(^
0
T ), under H1. Using (24), we have
^T0;h(^
0
T )!p h(0;1; eqT0) = s0 hh  1 h  0i eqT0 :
It is now readily follows that under H1; the multi-horizon test statistic, TH , dened by (29) is dis-
tributed as a non-central 2H(CH), with the non-centrality parameter CH = 
0
H
h
V ar

d^H
i 1
H >
0, where V ar

d^H

is given by (28). The power is increasing in CH which in turn depends on the
norm of H . Specically, CH  max
h
V ar

d^H
i 1
0HH , where max
h
V ar

d^H
i 1
=
min
h
V ar

d^H
i
is strictly positive abd bounded in H. Furthermore, so long as eqT0 6= 0, then
0HH =
PH
h=1 
2
h(
0;1; eqT0) > 0, and the test has power for any H. In this case he power of the
test rises with
1   0 and keqT0k, and falls with V ar d^H. However, due to the stationary
nature of the DSGE model, as formalized by Assumption 2, h(0;1; eqT0) ! 0, as h ! 1, at
the exponential rate of [max(())]
h, which ensures that 0HH is bounded in H. This in turn
means that the test need not be consistent, in the sense that the power of the test need not tend
to unity as H !1.
4.1.2 Mean policy e¤ects test without Gaussianity
We can minimize the role of the Gaussianity assumption by basing the policy ine¤ectiveness test
on a "mean policy e¤ect", computed over the post-intervention horizon T0+h, for h = 1; 2; :::;H,
namely
d^H(^
0
T ) =
1
H
HX
h=1
d^T0+h(^
0
T ): (31)
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For a xed H, the implicit null hypothesis of no policy e¤ects can now be specied as
H 00 : p lim
T!1
 
H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h(^
0
T )
!
= 0: (32)
As we shall see, this condition is met under Assumptions 1, 2a, 3 and 4 when H is xed and as
T !1.
Interestingly enough, H 00 continues to hold even if H ! 1, so long as Assumption 2b holds
and the rate of increase of H in relation to T is governed by the joint asymptotic condition 1. If
the underlying RE model is correctly specied, then under the null of no policy change, H0, we
have
H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h(^
0
T ) =  s0
(
H 1=2
HX
h=1
h
h

^
0
T

 h  0i) eqT0 : (33)
Now using results in Lemmas S2 and S3, given in the online supplement, we haveH 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h(^
0
T )
  s0 keqT0kH 1=2

HX
h=1
h
h

^
0
T

 h  0i
 K s0 keqT0kH 1=2
 
HX
h=1
hh 1T
!^0T   0 ; (34)
where K is a xed constant. Using (A.3) in Lemma S3, we have(^0T )  (0)+ aT ^0T   0 ;
where aT =
@0T =@0, and elements of 0T lie on the line segment joining 0 and ^0T .
Considering that 0T !p 0, and by Assumption 4,
@ij()=@0 for all i and j exist and are
bounded, then it must also follow that aT is bounded in T . Hence, recalling that under Assumption
3,
p
T
^0T   0 = Op(1), then T   + aTT 1=2, where   0  , and aT is bounded in
T . In the case where H is xed and T !1,H 1=2
 
HX
h=1
hh 1T
!  H 1=2
HX
h=1
h

+ aTT
 1=2
h 1 ! H 1=2 HX
h=1
hh 1 < K, as T !1.
Using this result in (34) and noting that under Assumptions 3 and 5, keqT0k is bounded in T;
and
^0T   0 = Op  T 1=2, then under the null of no policy change, H0, for a xed H and as
T !1, we have
H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h(^
0
T )
!p 0, as required.
Consider now the case where H rises with T and the rate of increase of H in relation to T is
governed by the joint asymptotic condition 1. Note also that under Assumption 2b,  < 1. Then
using (A.4) and (A.5) in Lemma S4 we have
HX
h=1
hh 1T =
1
(1  )2 +Op

T 1=2

+Op
 
HH

; (35)
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HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
jj 1T =
1
(1  )2

H   1 + 
1  

+Op

T 1=2

+Op
 
HH

: (36)
Using (35) in (34), and (36) we obtain
H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h(^
0
T ) = Op

H 1=2T 1=2

+Op
 
H 1=2H
T 1=2
!
; under H0 (37)
Therefore, under H0; H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h(^
0
T ) tends to zero in probability if H = T
, for   1=2; as
H and T !1 (the joint asymptotic condition 1).
To derive the distribution of d^H(^
0
T ); using Lemma S1, in the online supplement, we rst
note that
1
H
HX
h=1
vT0;h =
1
H
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
s0j(1) (1)uT0+h j =
1
H
HX
j=1
s0AH j (1)  (1)uT0+h j ; (38)
where
AH j (1) = Ikz+1 + 1 + 21 + :::+ H j1 = (Ikz+1 1) 1 (Ikz+1 H j+11 ): (39)
To simplify notations we have used 1 for (1). Considering that under H0, ^T0;H(^
0
T ) =
Op(T
 1=2), we have
V ar
p
Hd^H(^
0
T )

= !20q + o(1);
where
!20q = s
0
24H 1 HX
j=1
AH j (1) "(1)A0H j (1)
35 s;
and "(1) = E("T+j"0T+j) =  (
1)u (
1)0. Therefore, the mean policy e¤ect test statistic
can be written as
TH =
p
Hd^H(^
0
T )q
!^20q
; (40)
where !20q can be estimated using pre-intervention sample as:
!^20q = s
0
8<:H 1
HX
j=1
AH j

(^
0
T )

"

^
0
T

A0H j

(^
0
T )
9=; s; (41)
where
AH j

(^
0
T )

= Ikz+1 + (^
0
T ) +
h
(^
0
T )
i2
+ :::+
h
(^
0
T )
iH j
(42)
"

^
0
T

= T 1
T0X
t=M
heqt  (^0T )eqt 1i heqt  (^0T )eqt 1i0 ; (43)
Under the null hypothesis of policy ine¤ectiveness, and assuming that the underlying RE model
is correctly specied and the innovations "T0+h =  ()uT0+h for h = 1; 2; :::;H are normally
distributed, then for a xed H and as T ! 1, we have TH !d N(0; 1). For moderate values of
H, small departures from normality of the innovations over the post-intervention sample might
not be that serious for the validity of the test.
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The power of TH test The power of the TH test, dened by (40), depends on the probability
limit of TH under the alternative hypothesis that 1 6= 0. Using (23) and suppressing the
dependence on (^
0
T ) for simplicity, we have
p
Hd^H = H
 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h +H
 1=2
HX
h=1
vT0;h: (44)
The random component, H 1=2
HX
h=1
vT0;h, has a limiting distribution with mean zero and a -
nite variance both under the null and the alternative hypotheses. Therefore, for the test to be
consistent H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h must diverge to innity with H. Under H1 : 
1 6= 0, we have
H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h =  s0
(
H 1=2
HX
h=1
h
h

^
0
T

 h  1i) eqT0
= s0
(
H 1=2
HX
h=1
h
h
 
1
 h  0i)qT0   s0
(
H 1=2
HX
h=1
h
h

^
0
T

 h  0i) eqT0 :
(45)
But it has been already established that (see (37))
s0
(
H 1=2
HX
h=1
h
h

^
0
T

 h  0i) eqT0 = Op H 1=2T 1=2+Op
 
H 1=2H
T 1=2
!
:
Hence, under H1
H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h = s
0
(
H 1=2
HX
h=1
h
h
 
1
 h  0i) eqT0+Op H 1=2T 1=2+Op
 
H 1=2H
T 1=2
!
:
Now set 1 = 
 
1

and 0 = 
 
0

, and note that
HX
h=1
h1 = 1(Ikz+1 H1 )(Ikz+1 1) 1.
Under Assumption 2, (Ikz+1  1) 1 exists and is nite and H1 ! 0 as H !1. Hence,
H 1=2
HX
h=1
h
 
1

= H 1=21(Ikz+1  H1 )(Ikz+1  1) 1 ! 0, as H !1.
Similarly, H 1=2
HX
h=1
h
 
0
 ! 0, with H, and H 1=2 HX
h=1
^T0;h = op(1), under the alternative
hypothesis. Hence, H 1=2
HX
h=1
^T0;h !p 0 under both the null and the alternative hypotheses as
T and H ! 1, subject to the joint asymptotic condition 1. Therefore, the internal dynamics
of the RE model do not contribute to the power of the policy ine¤ectiveness test for T and H
large. Thus tests based on the average policy e¤ects, d^H , will not be consistent in the case of
stationary DSGE models. In such cases, the best that can be hoped for is to base the test of the
policy ine¤ectiveness on a short post-intervention sample and accept that the test is likely to be
sensitive to the specications of the post-intervention disturbances, uT0+h, h = 1; 2; :::;H.
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4.2 Tests of policy interventions that change the steady state
In this case the counterfactual values of yT0+h are dened by (17) and the associated policy e¤ects
by (16). Hence, the estimated values of policy e¤ects can be computed as
d^T0+h(^
0
T ;
0) = yT0+h   y^0T0+h
= yT0+h   yT0+h
 
0
  s0h ^0T qT0   qT0  0 ; for h = 1; 2; :::;H; (46)
where 0 is the pre-intervention parameter vector of the steady state.14 Furthermore, since it is
only the steady state parameters that change, 1 = 0, and post-intervention realized values of
yT0+h are given by
yT0+h = y

T0+h
 
1

+ s0h(0)

qT0   qT0
 
0

+
h 1X
j=0
j
 
0

 (0)uT0+h j ; for h = 1; 2; :::;H;
which if used in (46) yields
d^T0+h(^
0
T ;
0) =

yT0+h
 
1
  yT0+h  0  s0 hh ^0T h(0)i qT0   qT0  0
+
h 1X
j=0
j
 
0

 (0)uT0+h j :
It is clear that under the null of no policy change, H0 : 
1 = 0, d^T0+h(^
0
T ;
0) has the same
asymptotic distribution as the one obtained in sub-sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 for the case when the
policy intervention applied to . The main di¤erence between the two types of policy change
relates to the their power under the alternative hypothesis. In the present case the power of the
test depends on T0+h = y

T0+h
 
1
  yT0+h  0 for h = 1; 2; :::;H, and rises with H, so long as
the policy change is permanent, namely jT0+hj remains bounded away from zero for all h. This
contrasts to the power of the test when the policy change only a¤ects deviations from the steady
state.
5 Simulated policy analysis using a new-Keynesian model
5.1 The model
In this section we illustrate the performance of policy tests based on mean e¤ects using simulations
from a standard three equation New Keynesian DSGE model. Similar results can be obtained for
the multi-horizon version of the test.
The new-Keynesian (NK) model is calibrated using parameter estimates from the literature
and we assume that there is no parameter or specication uncertainty. The variables, which are
measured in deviations from their steady states, are eRt = Rt   Rt ; the interest rate deviation,
14Here we are assuming that policy parameters a¤ecting the steady state are known, which is the case when we
consider changes to the ination target. The analysis can be readily modied to allow for possible uncertainty in
the policy parameters of the steady state.
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eyt = yt  yt ; log real output gap, and et = t  t ; the deviation of ination rate from target. As
above, the policy intervention takes place at time T0; with a post-intervention sample, T0+1; T0+
2; :::; T0 + H: After setting out the model, we rst consider an intervention which changes the
DSGE parameters of the Taylor rule, but not the steady state, and examine the size and power
of the test. Then we consider an intervention where the steady state ination target is changed
as well as the parameters of the Taylor rule. The model, in terms of deviations from steady state
is
eRt = R eRt 1 + (1  R)( et +  yeyt) + uRt; (47a)eyt = yeyt 1 + E(eyt+1 jIt )   h eRt   E(et+1 jIt )i+ uyt; (47b)et = et 1 + E(et+1 jIt ) + eyt + ut; (47c)
which is of the form (1) where eqt = ( eRt; eyt; et)0, ut = (uRt; uyt; ut)0;
A0 =
0@ 1  (1  r) y  (1  r)  1 0
0   1
1A ; A1 =
0@ 0 0 00  
0 0 
1A ; A2 =
0@ R 0 00 y 0
0 0 
1A ;
(48)
and V ar(ut) = diag(2uR; 
2
uy; 
2
u).
The parameters are calibrated using estimates from the DSGE literature. Parameters of (47c)
are calibrated based on average estimates from eight major economies as summarized in Table 5 of
Dees et al (2009). The parameters of (47b) and the long run parameters of the Taylor rule, (47a),
are calibrated using the results in Dennis (2009). The calibrated values of 0 are summarized in
Table 1 below. The standard deviations of the errors were all set equal to 0.005, or half a percent
per quarter, which is similar to the US values found in Dees et al. (2009).
Table 1. Pre-intervention parameter values, 0; used in the Monte Carlo Analysis
 = 0:065  = 0:57  = 0:65  = 0:045   = 1:5  y = 0:5
y = 0:42  = 0:34 R = 0:7 u = 0:005 uy = 0:005 uR = 0:005
The solution for these calibrated parameters is given by15
eqt= (0)eqt 1 +  (0)ut; (49)
(0) =
0@ 0:65 0:13 0:20 0:17 0:62  0:05
 0:06 0:08 0:47
1A ;  (0) =
0@ 0:93 0:31 0:60 0:24 1:49  0:15
 0:08 0:19 1:39
1A : (50)
The dynamic responses of the model to the e¤ects of monetary policy, demand and supply shocks
are documented in the online supplement, where we also provide policy impulse response functions.
15This solution is obtained using the iterative back-substitution procedure advanced in Binder and Pesaran (1995).
See the online supplement for further details.
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The results are as to be expected and to save space will not be discussed here. Instead we focus
on the small sample properties of the policy ine¤ectiveness test proposed in the paper.
We consider four separate policy interventions, in which each of the parameters of the Taylor
rule are changed one at a time, leaving the other parameters unchanged. Intervention 1A increases
the interest rate persistence in the Taylor Rule, R; from 0:7 to 0:9: Intervention 1B reduces R
from 0:7 to 0:25: Intervention 1C increases the ination coe¢ cient in the Taylor rule,  , from
1:5 to 2:5. Intervention 1D increases the output coe¢ cient in the Taylor rule,  y, from 0:5 to 1.
The values of 1 that are changed under alternative policy interventions are given in Table 2.
Table 2: Policy interventions
Interventions 0 1
1A R = 0:7 R = 0:9
1B R = 0:7 R = 0:25
1C   = 1:5   = 2:5
1D  y = 0:5  y = 1:0
* The other elements of 1 are kept at their pre-intervention values.
The initial values, eqT0 ; play an important role and should reect a sensible combination of
values of interest rate, ination and output. One possible approach is to set eqT0 equal to the
impact e¤ects of IRFs. For example, one could set eqT0 to eqR;T0 = uR (0)eR; which is the
impact e¤ect of a monetary policy shock. Similarly, for the demand and supply shocks qT0 can
be set to eqy;T0 = u y (0)ey and eq;T0 = u (0)e, respectively, where ey = (0; 1; 0)0 and
e = (0; 0; 1)
0. These values are given by the columns of  (0) dened by (50). Multiples of the
e¤ects of such shocks represent di¤erent degrees of deviations from equilibrium. The power of the
policy ine¤ectiveness test will then be an increasing function of the extent to which, at the time
of the policy change, the economy has deviated from steady state.
5.2 Tests for interventions that do not change the steady state
We computed size and power of the policy ine¤ectiveness tests using the calibrated values of 0;
for di¤erent initial states, eqT0 . We generated values of eqT0+h; h = 1; 2; :::;H; for horizons H = 8;
and H = 24 from (49) assuming u(b)t s IIDN(0;u);for b = 1; 2; ::; 2000; replications, where
u = diag(
2
uR; 
2
uy; 
2
u).
16 For replication b the policy e¤ects are simulated as
d^
(b)
T0+h
= eq(b)T0+h  h  0 eqT0 ; (51)
for h = 1; 2; :::;H. The policy mean e¤ect is calculated as d^
(b)
H = H
 1
HX
h=1
d^
(b)
T0+h
; and the test
statistic as T (b)d;H =
p
Hd^
(b)
H =!^0q, where
!^20q =
8<:H 1
HX
j=1
AH j
 
(0)

"
 
0
A0H j  (0)
9=; ;
16More specically, eq(b)T0+h= ()eq(b)T0+h 1 +  ()u(b)T0+h, for h = 1; 2; :::; H, with eq(b)T0 = eqT0 .
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and
AH j
 
(0)

= Ikz+1 + (
0) + 2(0) + :::+ H j(0):
Table 3 shows the size and power of the policy ine¤ectiveness tests against four alternative
policy interventions, two evaluation horizons and three initial states. The size of the test was
calculated with eq(b)T0+h generated using 0; and the power was obtained with eq(b)T0+h generated
using one of the four alternative policy interventions which change 0 to 1A; :::;1D, as set out
in Table 2. The initial states are given in di¤erent rows of the Table. The rows labelled eqR;T0
give the rejection frequencies for the initial state corresponding to the e¤ects of a one standard
deviation monetary policy shock; the rows labelled eqy;T0 refer to a demand shock and the rows
labelled eq;T0 refer to a supply shock.
Table 3: Size, 0, and power of policy ine¤ectiveness tests
against 4 alternatives 1A;1B;1C ;1D ; horizons H = 8; 24; 3 initial states
Size (0) Power (1A) Power (1B) Power (1C) Power (1D)eR ey e eR ey e eR ey e eR ey e eR ey e
H = 8eqR;T0 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.07eqy;T0 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.18 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.06eq;T0 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.06
H = 24eqR;T0 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.25 0.17 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07eqy;T0 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.25 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.06eq;T0 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.24 0.18 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.06
Notes: The rows labelled eqR;T0 set the initial state eqT0 = uR (0)eR. Similarly for eqy;T0 = uy (0)ey, andeq;T0 = u (0)e. eR = (1; 0; 0); ey = (0; 1; 0); e = (0; 0; 1): The alternative hypotheses are set out in Table 2.
The test sizes are close to the nominal value of 5%. The power is highest for intervention, 1A,
where the degree of persistence of the Taylor rule increases from R = 0:7; to R = 0:9: Even in
case 1A the power is not high. At H = 8 the highest power is 20% for testing the e¤ect on yt and
using the initial state, eqR;T0 or eq;T0 : At H = 24 the highest power is 25% for testing the e¤ect on
yt. The test has little power against the other three types of interventions.17 Whereas the test has
power against the increase in persistence of the Taylor rule it has less power against the reduction
in the persistence of the Taylor rule for output and ination because the variables return to zero
quickly. The test also has little power against changes in the coe¢ cients of ination and output
in the Taylor rule because they have relatively little e¤ect on the other variables on impact.
Figure 1 shows the rejection frequency for intervention 1A (increasing the degree of interest
rate smoothing) as a function of the initial deviation from steady state, measured in standard
17Similar outcomes are also reported by Rudebusch (2005) who, in the context of the Lucas Critique, shows that
the apparent policy invariance of reduced forms is consistent with the magnitude of historical policy shifts and the
relative insensitivity of the reduced forms of plausible forward looking macroeconomic specications to policy shifts.
However, here we use formal tests based on structural models.
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deviations of monetary policy shock, eqR;T0 . The rejection frequencies increase with the deviation
of the initial value from zero, and are roughly symmetric for positive and negative values. The
rejection frequencies are highest for output, intermediate for ination and lowest for interest
rates. The results are similar, but with lower rejection frequencies, when the initial states are set
to multiples of demand and supply shocks.
Figure 1. Rejection frequencies for intervention 1A (increasing R from 0:7 to 0:9)
with the initial states at k standard deviations of eqR;T0, and H = 8 quarters
These simulations conrm the theoretical results. The size of the test is correct. The e¤ect of
the policy intervention depends on the dynamics, reductions in the degree of persistence reduce
the e¤ect of changing the policy parameters. The power of the test depends on the state of the
economy at the time of the policy intervention. In our example, the test has some power against
increases in the persistence of the Taylor rule, but not against the other policy changes considered.
However, the e¤ects of all these policy changes are transitory, none have any e¤ect on the steady
states.
5.3 Tests for interventions that change the steady state ination target
Consider now interventions that change the steady state. As an example, suppose the policy
maker changes the target rate of ination which we assume constant and denote by . We
assume the announcement of the change in the ination target is credible and fully understood.18
To represent this intervention in the New Keynesian example, where the variables are measured
as deviations from steady state, we need to re-write the ination and interest rate deviations
in terms of their realized values which we denote by t and Rt: Note that t = et +  and
Rt = eRt + (r+); where  is the target rate of ination, and r denotes the steady state value
of the real interest rate. In terms of the realized values of ination and interest rates (t and Rt)
and deviations for the output gap (eyt), we have
18Kulish and Pagan (2017) consider a change in ination target when there is both perfect and imperfect credi-
bility.
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Rt = (1  R) [r + (1   )] + RRt 1 + (1  R)( t +  yeyt) + uRteyt =  r + yeyt 1 + E(eyt+1 jIt )   [Rt   E(t+1 jIt )] + uyt
t = (1     ) + t 1 + E(t+1 jIt ) + eyt + ut:
and settingqt = (Rt; eyt; t)0, we obtain
A0qt = A1Et(qt+1) + A2qt 1 + A3 + ut;
where
A3 =
0@ (1  R) [r + (1   )] r
(1     )
1A :
The other matrices, A0, A1, and A2; are given as before by (48). The solution in terms ofqt is
given by
qt = [I3  ()]q + ()qt 1 +  ()ut;
whereq = (r + ; 0; )0, and () and  () are dened as before.
Suppose now that the policy intervention at time T0 took the form of changing the ination
target from 0 to 1. In this case the policy e¤ects are given by
d^T0+h = s
0qT0+h   s0h

^
0
T

qT0   s0
h 1X
j=0
j

^
0
T
 h
I3  

^
0
T
i
q0;
whereq0 = (r + 0; 0; 0)0
d^T0+h = s
0qT0+h   s0h

^
0
T

qT0   s0
n
I3  h

^
0
T
o
q0; (52)
Where only the ination target is changed the power of the test rises with
p
Hs0
 
q1  q0

=p
H
 
1   0

(1; 0; 1)0s, and tends to unity in the case of ination and the nominal interest rate,
as to be expected, and has no power as H !1, for real output deviations, eyt: Nevertheless, the
change in the ination target does have short run e¤ects on real output. This is reected in the
policy impulse response function and the test outcomes. The policy impulse response function
when only the ination target is changed is given by
PIRF (h; 1   0; ) =
 
1   0
n
I3  h ()
o0@ 10
1
1A ; for h = 1; 2; :::;H: (53)
It is clear that in the limit as H !1, the PIRF tends to  1   0 (1; 0; 1)0, which also conrms
that in the NK model only nominal values are a¤ected in the long run by changes in the ination
target.
The short run impacts of changes in the ination target can be illustrated using the parame-
terization given above. For this purpose we consider two scenarios, a reduction of 0 from 2% to
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1% per quarter and an increase of 0 from 1% to 2% per quarter. Initially we do not change any
of the other policy parameters, which are kept at the baseline values listed in Table 1. Figure 2a
gives the responses to the reduction and 2b to the increase in the ination target. In the case of
a reduction, ination falls more than the interest rate, raising the real interest rate on impact to
0.44% and thus depressing output. The real interest rate and output return to zero, leaving the
nominal interest rate and ination rate at the new target 1% lower after about seven quarters.
When the target rate of ination is increased the e¤ects are reversed: ination jumps more than
interest rates, the real interest rate falls on impact to -0.44%, temporarily raising output.
Figure 2: Policy impulse response functions for changes in target rates of ination
2a. Reduction of 0 = 2% to 1 = 1% per quarter
2b. Increase of 0 = 1% to 1 = 2% per quarter
In the case where there is both a change in the steady state and a change in the policy rule
parameters, the policy impulse response functions are given by
PIRF (h; 1;
1; 0;
0) =
h
h
 
1
 h  0iqT0 + nI3  h  1oq1   nI3  h  0oq0;
=
n
h
 
1
 h  0o  qT0  q0+ I3    1h  q1  q0
where
q0 =
0@ r + 00
0
1A ;q1  q0 =  1   0
0@ 10
1
1A :
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More specically, for a unit monetary policy shock at the point of intervention, we set qT0 =
q0 + uR (^0T )eR, and hence
PIRF (h; 1;
1; 0;
0) = uR
n
h
 
1
 h  0o (0)eR (54)
+
 
1   0
 
I3  
 
1
h0@ 10
1
1A :
which reduces to (53) when only the ination target is changed. Similar expressions can be
obtained when the initial state is set to values ofq that arise on impact from demand or supply
shocks.
We now consider combining the change in the ination target with changes in the degree of
ination smoothing. Figure 3a presents the e¤ects of simultaneously reducing the ination target
from 2% to 1% and increasing the ination smoothing parameter, R, from 0:7 to 0:9, intervention
1A above, with the initial state set toqR;T0 . This intervention causes ination to drop sharply,
overshooting its steady state of 1%, hitting 1.55% after about 4 quarters. The real interest rate
rises to 1.25%, depressing output, before the variables return to their steady state. Figure 3b
shows that increasing the target rate of ination has similar but the opposite e¤ects. Comparing
the reduction in the target rate of ination in Figure 3a with that in Figure 2a, the increased
interest rate smoothing has resulted in a much larger loss of output. Whereas in Figure 4a the
maximum loss of output was 0.3% per quarter, in gure 5a the maximum loss was 1.1%, in both
cases around quarter 3.
Figure 3: Policy impulse response functions for changes in target rates of ination
plus increased interest rate smoothing
Intervention 1A : R from 0:7 to 0:9, initial stateqR;T0
3a. Reduction of 0 = 2% to 1 = 1% per quarter
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3b. Increase of 0 = 1% to 1 = 2% per quarter
Figure 4 shows the results when the change in ination target is combined with reduced
interest rate smoothing. For a credible reduction in the ination target and very little interest rate
smoothing, the interest rate and the ination rate reduce by almost exactly the same amount and
output hardly falls. With an increase in the ination target and reduced interest rate smoothing,
ination increases more than interest rates and the lower real interest rates provides a boost to
output. While the results are specic to this parameterisation and the assumption of credibility,
it seems likely that less interest rate smoothing is appropriate when reducing the target rate of
ination, as in Figure 4a, since this causes less output loss, and more interest rate smoothing
seems more appropriate when increasing the target rate of ination, since this provides a bigger
boost to output.
Figure 4: Policy impulse response functions for changes in target rates of ination
plus reduced interest rate smoothing
Intervention 1B : R from 0:7 to 0:25, initial stateqR;T0
4a. Reduction of 0 = 2% to 1 = 1% per quarter
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4b. Increase of 0 = 1% to 1 = 2% per quarter
We now consider the e¤ect on size and power of the policy ine¤ectiveness test in detecting the
e¤ects of changes in the target rate of ination on ination, output deviations and the interest
rate. We only consider the case where the ination target is reduced from 2% to 1% per quarter,
the results for an increase were almost identical. We consider two interventions. In the rst, called
1E ; the interest rate smoothing parameter is left unchanged at R = 0:7, in the second, called
1F ; R is increased to 0:9 at the same time as the reduction in the ination target is announced.
If the target rate is reduced without any other policy changes, the power of the tests based on the
nominal interest rate and the ination rate are quite high and rise substantially as the horizon
of the test is increased from H = 8 to 24 quarters. In contrast, and as to be expected noting
the PIRFs depicted in Figure 2, the test has little power for output, since the e¤ect of a change
in the ination target on the real output is small and transitory. Under intervention 1F ; when
there is both a change in the ination target and an increase in interest rate smoothing, the power
of the test based on ination outcomes is increased, but for interest rates the power is reduced
relative to the case 1E ; since the increased smoothing means that interest rates do not change as
much. The increased smoothing causes a larger movement in real interest rates as noted above
and this causes a greater e¤ect on output hence a higher power in detecting the e¤ects of the
policy change on realized values of output deviations. Whereas for interest rates and ination,
the power increases as the horizon is extended, for output deviations, which is moving back to its
steady state value of zero, the power falls as the horizon is extended.
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Table 4: Size and power of policy ine¤ectiveness tests against reducing the ination
target only (1E) and when ination target reduction is accompanied by a rise in
interest rate smoothing (1F )- Horizons H = 8; 24; 3 initial states (qT0)
Size (0) Power (1E) Power (1F )
R ey  R ey  R ey 
Initial states H = 8
qR;T0 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.29 0.07 0.72 0.13 0.39 0.90
qy;T0 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.26 0.07 0.68 0.17 0.33 0.86
q;T0 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.28 0.06 0.70 0.16 0.35 0.88
H = 24
qR;T0 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.73 0.07 0.99 0.65 0.30 0.98
qy;T0 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.73 0.05 0.99 0.70 0.28 0.98
q;T0 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.71 0.05 0.99 0.68 0.29 0.99
Notes: See notes to Table 3. Alternative hypothesis 1E assumes that the ination target is reduced from
0 = 2% to 
1
 = 1% per quarter. Alternative hypothesis 
1F combines the reduction of the ination target from
0 = 2% to 
1
 = 1% per quarter with a higher degree of interest rate smoothing, raising R from 0:7 to 0:9.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we propose formal tests for two types of policy intervention in the context of DSGE
models. One involves a change in a policy parameter that does not alter the steady state, as is
standard in the literature, the other a change in a policy parameter that only alters the steady
state. Two versions of the policy ine¤ectiveness tests are considered, a multi-horizon version and
a mean e¤ect version.
The tests are based on the di¤erences, over a given policy evaluation horizon, between the
post-intervention realizations of the target variable and the associated counterfactual outcomes
based on the parameters estimated using data before the policy intervention. The power of the
policy ine¤ectiveness tests depends on the degree of persistence of the model and the deviation
from steady state at the time of the intervention, but the power will not go to unity as the
evaluation horizon increases, that is the tests will not be consistent, unless the policy intervention
changes the steady state.
The formal tests considered in the paper are important for policy analysis as they highlight
the importance of allowing for future shocks in policy evaluations. A policy impulse response
function is also proposed which is more relevant when the policy intervention is formulated in
terms of a change in a policy parameter, as compared to standard impulse response function that
considers the deterministic e¤ects of a policy shock, dened as a one standard deviation change
in a structural disturbance of interest. The policy ine¤ectiveness tests that we have developed
take account of deterministic as well as random components of policy outcomes and are likely to
be more relevant for ex post policy analyses.
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S1 Statement and proof of lemmas
Lemma S1 Let A be a k  k matrix and xT+h j a k  1 vector, and suppose that Ik A is
invertible, then
H 1
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
AjxT+h j = H 1
HX
j=1
 
Ik+A + :::+ A
H jxT+j
= H 1 (Ik A) 1
HX
j=1
 
Ik  AH j+1

xT+j
= (Ik A) 1
0@H 1 HX
j=1
xT+j
1A  (Ik A) 1
0@H 1 HX
j=1
AH j+1xT+j
1A :
Proof. The result follows by direct manipulation of the terms.
Lemma S2 Suppose that the kk matrices A and B have bounded spectral norms kAk   and
kBk  , for some xed positive constant . ThenAh  Bh  hh 1 kA Bk ; for h = 1; 2; :::: (A.1)
Proof. We establish this result by backward induction. It is clear that it holds for h = 1. For
h = 2, using the identity
A2  B2 = A(A B) + (A B)B;
the result for h = 2 followsA2  B2  (kAk+ kBk) kA Bk = 2 kA Bk :
More generally, we have the identity
Ah  Bh = Ah(A B) + (A B)Bh + A(Ah 2  Bh 2)B:
Now suppose now that (A.1) holds for h  2, and using the above note thatAh  Bh  Ah 1 kA Bk+ kA Bk Bh 1+ kAk Ah 2  Bh 2 kBk
 kAkh 1 kA Bk+ kA Bk kBkh 1 + kAk
Ah 2  Bh 2 kBk
 2h 1 kA Bk+ 2
Ah 2  Bh 2
 2h 1 kA Bk+ 2
h
(h  2)h 3 kA Bk
i
 hh 1 kA Bk :
S1
Hence, if (A.1) holds for h   2; then it must also hold for h. But since we have established that
(A.1) holds for h = 1 and h = 2, then it must hold for any h.
Lemma S3 Consider the k  k matrix A() = (aij()), where k is a nite integer and aij(),
for all i; j = 1; 2; ::; k; are continuously di¤erentiable real-valued functions of the p  1 vector of
parameters,  2 . Suppose that aij() has nite rst order derivatives at all points in , and
assume that ^T is a
p
T consistent estimator of 0. ThenA(^T ) A(0)  aT ^T   0 ; (A.2)A(^T )  A(0)+ aT ^T   0 ; (A.3)
where aT =
@A  T  =@0 is bounded in T , and elements of T2  lie on the line segment
joining 0 and ^T
Proof. Consider the mean-value expansions
aij

^T

  aij
 
0

=
@aij
 
T

@0

^T   0

; for i; j = 1; 2; :::; k;
where elements of T lie on the line segment joining 0 and ^T . Given that ^T is consistent for
0, it must also be that T !p 0; as T !1. Collecting all the k2 terms we have
A(^T ) A(0) =
 
@A
 
T

@0
!h
Ik 


^T   0
i
;
where 
 denotes the Kronecker matrix product. Hence
A(^T ) A(0)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@A
 
T

@0
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A(^T ) =
A(0) +
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
^T   0
i  A(0)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@A
 
T

@0
^T   0 :
The results (A.2) and (A.3) now follow since T !p 0, and by assumption the derivatives
@aij
 
0

=@0 exist and are bounded in T .
Lemma S4 Suppose that T = +T 1=2aT , aT > 0 and bounded in T , T 6= 1, H = T , where
  1=2, 0 <  < 1, and  is a positive xed constant. Then
HX
h=1
hh 1T =
1
(1  )2 +Op

T 1=2

+Op
 
HH

; (A.4)
and
HX
h=1
h 1X
j=0
jj 1T =
1
(1  )2

H   1 + 
1  

+Op

T 1=2

+Op
 
HH

: (A.5)
S2
Proof. We rst note that
HX
h=1
hh 1T =
@
@T
 
HX
h=1
hT
!
=
1  HT
(1  T )2
  H
H
T
(1  T ) ; (A.6)
Also since T = +Op
 
T 1=2

HX
h=1
hh 1T =
1
(1  )2 +Op

T 1=2

+Op
 
HHT

: (A.7)
But,
HT =

+ T 1=2aT
H
= H
 
1 +
T 1=2aT

!H
= Op

HedTH=
p
T

; (A.8)
where dT = aT =, which is also bounded in T . Finally, H=
p
T = T 1 =2 and for   1=2, edTH=
p
T
will be bounded in T . Using this result in (A.7) yields (A.4), as desired. Similarly,
HX
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Using (A.6) we have
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:
Now using (A.8) and recalling that T = +Op
 
T 1=2

, we obtain (A.5).
S2 The numerical solution of the DGSE model used in Section 5
The unique solution of the New Keynesian model is given by (see also equation (2) in the paper):
eqt= ()eqt 1 +  ()ut;
where() solves the quadratic matrix equationA12( A0()+A2 = 0, and  = [A0  A1()] 1 :
() can be solved numerically by iterative back-substitution procedure which involves iterating
on an initial arbitrary choice of () say ((0)) = (0) using the recursive relation
(r) = [Ik (A 10 A1)(r 1)] 1(A 10 A2):
See Binder and Pesaran (1995) for further details. The iterative procedure is continued until
convergence using the criteria k (r)  (r 1) kmax 10 6.
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S3 Standard and Policy Impulse Response Functions for the new-
Keynesian model
Here we rst provide impulse response functions, IRFs for the e¤ects of monetary policy, demand
and supply shocks in the new-Keynesian model. As Figure S1 shows a contractionary monetary
policy shock raises interest rates and reduces output and ination, with output falling by more
than ination. A positive demand shock increases all three variables; output by the most, then
interest rates, and then ination. A negative supply shock, increases ination, the interest rate
rises to o¤set the higher ination, but not by as much as ination and output falls. The impact
e¤ects of the monetary policy shock are given by the rst column of  (0) dened by equation
(50) of the paper, while the impact e¤ects of the demand and supply shocks are given by its second
and third columns. It is clear that in terms of IRFs the behaviour of the model is as expected.
Turning to the policy impulse response function, PIRF, discussed in Section 3.1 of the paper,
as noted in the text it is important that the choice of eqT0 reects a sensible combination of values
of interest rate, ination and output. One possible approach is to set eqT0 equal to the impact
e¤ects of IRFs. For example, one could set eqT0 to eqR;T0 = uR (0)eR; which is the impact
e¤ect of a monetary policy shock. Similarly, for the demand and supply shocks qT0 can be set toeqy;T0 = u y (0)ey and eq;T0 = u (0)e, respectively, where ey = (0; 1; 0)0 and e = (0; 0; 1)0.
These values are given by the columns of  (0) dened by equation (50) of the paper. We will
also consider multiples of the e¤ects of such shocks as representing di¤erent degrees of deviations
from equilibrium. The power of the policy ine¤ectiveness test will then be an increasing function
of the extent to which, at the time of the policy change, the economy has deviated from steady
state.
Figure S2 shows PIRFs for the e¤ects of changing the degree of persistence (or the interest rate
smoothing) associated with the Taylor rule, Figure S2a shows the e¤ect of intervention 1A and
Figure S2b of 1B. These are the only policy changes which have much e¤ect. This is consistent
with the theoretical results that it is the dynamics that are central to policy having mean e¤ects.
Intervention 1A increases the degree of persistence from R = 0:7; to R = 0:9: This causes the
interest rate to rise and output and ination to fall initially, with a maximum e¤ect after about
three periods before returning to zero. Intervention 1B reduces the degree of persistence from
R = 0:7; to R = 0:25: This has the opposite e¤ect causing the interest rate to fall, by more than
it rose in case 1A; and output and ination to rise by rather less than they fell under case 1A.
The initial e¤ects are the same as the values of


 
1
   0 for the two cases. When the
degree of persistence is low as in intervention 1B, the variables return to zero much faster, making
the mean e¤ect of policy much smaller. This is reected in the power of the policy ine¤ectiveness
tests discussed in the text.
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Figure S1: Impulse response functions for interest rates, eRt, output, eyt, and
ination et deviations
S1a. Monetary Policy Shock
S1b. Demand Shock
S1c. Supply Shock
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Figure S2: Policy impulse response functions: eqR;T0 = uR (0)eR.
S2a. Intervention 1A : R = 0:7; to R = 0:9
S2b. Intervention 1B : R = 0:7; to R = 0:25
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